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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises (hereafter ‘SRSG’ or ‘Ruggie’) proposed a new ‘policy and conceptual 
framework’ to ‘anchor the business and human rights debate’.1 The 2008 
framework was the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework’ or ‘Ruggie 
Framework’, and was subsequently ‘operationalized’ in the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘Guiding Principles’) from 
2011.2 Both the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles were quickly 
universally or nearly universally accepted by all relevant actors: Governments, the 
business community and – arguably, to a lesser extent – civil society.3 Since then, 
the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles have become undoubtedly ‘the’ 
focal point in the business and human rights debate.4   
The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the Ruggie Framework 
and Guiding Principles on transnational human rights litigation. ‘Transnational 
human rights litigation’, in essence, refers to legal claims brought against 
‘transnational corporations’ for human rights harms, typically by workers or 
communities from so-called ‘host’ states (where there is a subsidiary or supplier in 
a transnational corporate group) but in the courts of so-called ‘home’ states (where 
                                                     
1 John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: a 
Framework for Business and Human Rights’, A/HRC/8/5, 7 April 2008, and specifically p.1. 
2 Ibid; and John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: ‘Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework’, A/HRC/17/31, 21 March 2011. (On the language of ‘operationalization’: see John Ruggie, 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: ‘Business and Human Rights: Towards 
Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/11/13, 22 April 2009, para. 
1).  
3 Ruggie, ‘Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, pp. 3-4; Ruggie, 
‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’, pp. 4-5; John Ruggie, Just Business: Multinational 
Corporations and Human Rights (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2013) pp. 104-106 and pp. 119-
124. For an overview of the reception of the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, including of the 
more critical attitude by some NGOs, see e.g. James Harrison, ‘An Evaluation of the Institutionalisation 
of Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence’, Legal Studies Research Paper 2012-18, University of 
Warwick School of Law, at pp. 3-4. For more critical academic evaluation of the Guiding Principles, see 
Radu Mares (ed), The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Foundations and Implementation 
(Leiden: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) and Surya Deva and David Bilchitz (eds), Human Rights 
Obligations of Businesses: Beyond the Corporate Responsibility to Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
4 As indeed desired by Ruggie: ‘but those things must cohere and become cumulative’ (Ruggie, 
Framework, para. 7, and para. 107); John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: 
‘Business and Human Rights: Further Steps towards the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/14/27, 9 April 2010, para. 5; Ruggie, Guiding Principles, para. 5.  
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the parent company or ‘core’ company in a transnational corporate group is 
based).5  
Ruggie himself refers to transnational human rights litigation, albeit briefly, at 
various points in his various reports to the UN Human Rights Council. In those 
references, he notes that although most transnational human rights litigation to 
date has taken place under the Alien Tort Statute 1789 in the US (‘ATS’),6 there 
have also been notable domestic civil claims against transnational corporations, as 
well as favourable developments for finding companies criminally liable 
domestically, both in the US and beyond.7 An important question for this paper is 
whether the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles have either or both: firstly, 
affected the way in which plaintiffs plead cases and/or, secondly, influenced 
judgments by domestic courts. With the ubiquity of the Ruggie Framework and 
Guiding Principles, one might expect the answer to both to be yes.  
A related discussion would be the impact on transnational human rights 
litigation of legislative developments subsequent to the Ruggie Framework and 
Guiding Principles. For example, a recent report sponsored by a coalition of 
NGOs concludes that that ‘some states’ have taken ‘regressive steps [with regard 
to the third pillar of the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles] since the 
adoption of the UNGPs, rather than work positively to ensure that effective 
remedy is accessible’.8 However, even though states are referred to in the plural, in 
reality, the focus of that sentiment would seem to be towards the United Kingdom 
and in particular the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012. The latter Act changes the rules on recovery of costs in civil cases, and has 
been described as possibly a ‘real disincentive’ to ‘legitimate business-related 
human rights claims’ in the UK by the SRSG himself.9  
The UK is mentioned at this point, as the focus of this paper will be on 
judicial decisions in both the United States of America and the UK. This is 
                                                     
5 For the most complete overview of this type of litigation to date, see Sarah Joseph, Corporations and 
Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2004). Specifically, these are claims against 
particular companies within, or linked to a, transnational corporate group, rather than against a 
‘transnational corporation’ per se: see Ruggie, Framework, para. 12; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 106.   
6 28 USCA § 1350. 
7 John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights 
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises: ‘Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts’, A/HRC/4/035, 9 
February 2007; Ruggie, Framework, para. 90; John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises: ‘Clarifying the Concepts of “Sphere of Influence and Complicity”’, A/HRC/8/16, 15 May 
2008, pp. 9-16; Ruggie, Further Steps, para. 75.   
8 Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale, Olivier de Schutter and Andie Lambe, ‘The Third Pillar: 
Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business’ (ICAR, CORE and 
ECCJ, 2013), p.1. For further details on the changes made, see pp. 52-53 (see also Richard Meeran, ‘Tort 
Litigation Against Multinational Corporations for Violations of Human Rights: An Overview of the 
Position Outside the United States’ (2011) 3 City University of Hong Kong Law Review 1, 18-19; Michael D. 
Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights Litigation in Non-U.S. Courts: A Comparative Scorecard’ (2013) 3 
UC Irvine Law Review, 127, 133-4).  
9 John Ruggie, Letter to UK Minister of Justice, Mr Jonathan Djanogly MP (16 May 2011). Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/law/2011/jun/16/united-nations-legal-aid-cuts-trafigura (accessed 1 
December 2013).  
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because, to date, the majority of transnational human rights litigation has occurred 
in these two jurisdictions, although obviously the greater majority of cases have 
occurred in the US.10 However, a viewpoint has developed in the academic 
literature in recent times that the UK may have as much, or even more, potential 
as a site for transnational human rights litigation than the US. This is due to recent 
judicial decisions in the UK or which affect the UK, so that if a company is 
‘domiciled’ in the UK, courts in the UK must take jurisdiction over a claim and 
cannot dismiss a case for forum non conveniens (FNC).11 In addition, in a recent 
opinion, the English Court of Appeal confirmed the liability at trial of a parent 
company under the tort of negligence to the employee of a subsidiary.12 In 
comparison, in the US, two successive decisions by the Supreme Court have 
limited the scope of the ATS, with a third decision more recently still declining 
personal jurisdiction in Daimler AG v. Bauman.13 Although this introduction has 
noted recent legislative developments, particularly in the UK, it should however be 
noted that the focus of this paper is the actual and possible impact of the Guiding 
Principles specifically on judicial decisions. 
Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles tells business enterprises to ‘respect 
human rights’, no matter – according to GP 14, the ‘size, sector, operational 
context, ownership and structure’ of the business enterprise. The ‘corporate 
responsibility to respect’ is expressed in slightly different ways throughout the 
SRSG’s reports to the Human Rights Council. According to GP 11, ‘this means 
they should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved’. In the earlier reports, 
Ruggie similarly defines the corporate responsibility to respect rights as ‘essentially 
[…] not to infringe on the rights of others’, but adds that this means, ‘put simply, 
to do no harm’.14 In the 2009 and 2010 reports, Ruggie summarises the corporate 
responsibility as ‘acting with due diligence to avoid infringing on the rights of 
others’.15 The difference with the Guiding Principles is that, for the first time, 
                                                     
10 E.g. Skinner et al, ‘The Third Pillar’, p.15. On the increasing potential (or perhaps not) of continental 
European jurisdictions as forums for transnational human rights litigation, see e.g. Jan Wouters and 
Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Litigation for Overseas Corporate Human Rights Abuses in the European Union: The 
Challenge of Jurisdiction’ (2009) 40 The George Washington International Law Review 939; Goldhaber, 
‘Corporate Human Rights Litigation’; Skinner et al, ‘The Third Pillar’.  
11 This is the effect of the decision by the European Court of Justice in Case 281/02 Owusu v. Jackson 
[2005] ECR I-1383, interpreting Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ 2000 
No. L12/1, 16 January 2001. (See also the novel claim in Vava v. Anglo-American South African Ltd that a 
foreign subsidiary was ‘domiciled’ in the UK (described as ‘arguable’ by the High Court in [2012] EWHC 
1969 (QB), [2012] 2 CLC 684; rejected subsequently at [2013] EWHC 2131 (QB)). 
12 Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
13 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 542 US 692 (2004) (holding that any new norms should be established with such 
specificity and universality as the three original 18th century paradigms); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 133 
S. Ct 1659 (2013); Bauman v. Daimlerchysler 134 S. Ct 746 (2014). The controversial decision by the Ninth 
Circuit, which was reversed by the Supreme Court, is 644 F 3d 909 (2011)). 
14 Ruggie, Framework, para. 24; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 3. 
15 Ruggie, Operationalizing, para.2; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 1. (See also Introduction to the Guiding 
Principles at para. 6). 
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Ruggie identifies a hierarchy and different consequences if a business enterprise 
either ‘causes’, ‘contributes’ or is ‘directly linked’ to adverse impacts, and also 
clarifies, again for the first time, that business enterprises have a responsibility to 
‘remediate’ in the first two situations.16  
However, from the very first articulation of Ruggie’s new framework, Ruggie 
explains that the way for business enterprises to ‘discharge’ the responsibility to 
respect is through ‘due diligence’.17 Due diligence, according to the SRSG, 
‘describes the steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and address 
adverse human rights impacts’.18 Ruggie in various reports for the UN Human 
Rights Council, and from Principles 16 to 24 of the Guiding Principles out of a 
total of only 31 principles, amplifies on his meaning of ‘due diligence’.  
It is normally assumed that Ruggie’s concept of due diligence draws on due 
diligence as applied in the context of corporate and securities law. However, this 
paper will explore an alternative, which is whether there might also be a parallel 
with ‘ordinary’ tort law. The word ‘ordinary’ is used here to indicate that the paper 
is referring to common law tort, municipal tort, plain ‘garden variety’ tort and/or 
state tort law, as opposed to the more complicated understanding of ‘tort’ (if that 
word is even appropriate) as a violation of the ‘law of nations’ under the ATS.19 
Indeed, this paper considers whether there might be a parallel not only between 
‘due diligence’ in the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles and domestic tort 
laws in the US and UK, but moreover also between the very concept of the 
‘corporate responsibility to respect’, as ‘put simply, [a duty] to do no harm’, and 
tort laws in the US and UK. 
That these are legitimate and valid questions to ask is undoubted. Before the 
decision of the US Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, Ruggie himself 
issued a brief, posing a series of - yet unanswered - questions about the 
relationship between the corporate responsibility to respect and transnational 
human rights litigation.20 If, as Ruggie wrote, Kiobel was the ‘ideal case for starting 
the conversation’, the aim of this paper is to carry on that conversation, exploring 
the possible overlap between the corporate responsibility and state or domestic 
tort laws.21 Indeed, this question may not have seemed as pressing to a US 
audience before the Kiobel decision. However, since Kiobel, the US academy seems 
                                                     
16 GPs 13 and 19 (Ruggie had mentioned ‘remediation’ previously, but only very briefly in the context of 
the corporate responsibility to respect, and without mentioning the afore-mentioned distinction). 
17 Ruggie, Framework, para. 56. 
18 Ibid. 
19 The word ‘tort’ arguably does not give a complete picture, when US courts under the ATS tend to use 
international criminal law concepts rather than equivalent concepts in domestic tort law when deciding 
‘ancillary’ (Doe I v. Unocal 395 F 3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) at 963) matters of liability. (See the difference 
between judgments in the same case in, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal (but vacated 403 F 3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)) and 
Khulumani v. Barclays National Bank 504 F 3d 254 (2nd Cir. 2007)).  
20 John Ruggie, ‘An Issues Brief: Kiobel and Corporate Social Responsibility’ (4 September 2012). 
Available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/CSRI/KIOBEL_AND_CORPORATE_SOCIAL_RESPONSIBILITY%20(3).pdf (accessed 1 
December 2013).    
21 Ibid. 
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universally to agree there will be henceforth more state tort law claims against 
transnational corporations.22 
The structure of this paper will be as follows. The paper will begin by 
providing an overview of the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles and in 
particular of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights. It will then 
explore the similarities and differences between the corporate responsibility to 
respect and the tort of negligence in the US and UK. The paper will then proceed 
to explore the consequences if there are found to be similarities between the 
corporate responsibility to respect under the Ruggie Framework and Guiding 
Principles and ‘ordinary’ tort laws.  
 
 
 
2. THE RUGGIE FRAMEWORK AND UN GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, appointed Ruggie 
as Special Representative in 2005, after the breakdown of the ‘Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights’ (which infamously would have imposed new direct 
legal obligations on transnational corporations and other business enterprises) 
approved by the Sub-Commission of the then UN Commission on Human 
Rights.23 This story is well known.24 Where the ‘Norms’ created division and 
controversy, Ruggie managed to achieve consensus and support. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that the latter is, however, sometimes used as a criticism 
of Ruggie, implying that the only way he managed to achieve consensus in this 
diverse area was by resorting to, in effect, the lowest common denominator and 
minimalism.25 
Ruggie was SRSG from 2005 to 2011. His mandate can be summarised as 
having consisted of three phases: the first phase, from 2005 to 2007, was the 
‘mapping’ stage; the second stage, in 2008, was the initial ‘recommendation’ stage, 
and the third stage, from 2008 to 2011, was the ‘operationalization’ stage.26 
                                                     
22 See, for example, the special issue of the UC Irvine Law Review in 2013 (volume 3). 
23 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev. 2 (2003); ‘approved’ by Sub-Commission in Resolution 
2003/16, 13 August 2003, contained in UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2,E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/43 (and 
rejection by Commission at Decision 2004/116, 22 April 2004, contained in UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2004/L.11/Add.7). Appointment of SRSG: UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69, 20 April 2005. 
More recently, calls for a new treaty on business and human rights have again resurfaced at the United 
Nations level, with the Government of Ecuador in September 2013, issuing a ‘statement’ at the 24th 
Session of the Human Rights Council, reportedly supported by 80 other countries and over 100 NGOs, 
to ‘work towards the elaboration of a legally binding instrument’ (General Debate – Item 3).  
24 Ruggie’s thoughts about the Norms are contained in John Ruggie, Interim Report of the SRSG on the 
Issue of Human Rights and TNCs and other Business Enterprises, Un Doc. E/CN/.4/2006/97 (2006). 
25 David Bilchitz, ‘The Ruggie Framework: An Adequate Rubric for Corporate Human Rights 
Obligations?’ (2010) 12 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights 199. 
26 Ruggie, Guiding Principles, paras. 4-5 (introduction). 
  
Astrid Sanders                                                                   The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’  
 
 7
Alternatively, as expressed by Harrison, the second stage answered the ‘what’ 
question and the third stage answered the ‘how’ question: firstly, ‘what states and 
business enterprises need to do to ensure business respect for human rights’ and, 
secondly and subsequently, ‘how to move from the conceptual framework of 
responsibilities to “practical, positive results on the ground”’.27 The position of the 
SRSG on the issue of human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises has been succeeded by a new UN Working Group 
on Business and Human Rights, at least for a period of three years.28 The mandate 
of the Working Group is, amongst others, to ‘promote the effective and 
comprehensive dissemination and implementation of the Guiding Principles’.29 It 
consists of five members, who are ‘independent experts’, and has just hosted the 
second annual Forum on Business and Human Rights at the UN in Geneva.30 
There are three parts, or ‘pillars’ in Ruggie’s words, to the framework and 
Guiding Principles. The first pillar is the ‘state duty to protect’, which includes the 
state’s legal obligations to ‘protect against human rights abuses within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction by third parties, including business enterprises’.31 This 
‘requires taking appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish and redress such 
abuse through effective policies, legislation, regulations and adjudication’.32 
Human rights experts have described this duty as imposing a standard of conduct, 
rather than requiring a particular result.33 The second pillar is the ‘corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights’ and will be discussed in more detail below. 
The third pillar is ‘effective access to remedies’, both judicial and non-judicial.34 
Ruggie recognises there are a ‘patchwork of mechanisms’ for possible remedy, 
both judicial and non-judicial, and state based and non-state based, but they 
remain ‘incomplete and flawed. It must be improved in its parts and as a whole’.35    
The result of this patchwork and gaps is that some of the most deserving possible 
recipients, who have suffered the more serious or systematic human rights 
violations, may be left without the possibility of a remedy, whether that remedy be 
an ‘apology, restitution, rehabilitation, financial or non-financial compensation’ or 
otherwise.36 Ruggie has consistently emphasised that each of the pillars is different 
but important in their own right, and only when they are pursued together will real 
                                                     
27 Harrison, ‘An Evaluation’, p. 3. 
28 UN. Doc A/HRC/17/4. (Ruggie’s recommendations for ‘follow-up to the mandate’ (11 February 
2011) can be found at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ruggie-special-
mandate-follow-up-11-feb-2011.pdf (accessed 1 December 2013)).  
29 Ibid. 
30 The latest report of the WG is available at UN.Doc A/23/32 (14 March 2013). 
31 GP 1. 
32 Ibid. 
33 For example, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Robert McCorquodale, ‘Is the Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the 
Guiding Principles Coherent?’ (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2208588 (accessed 1 December 2013)):  ‘in these 
circumstances, a State’s obligation is not to prevent third parties from committing wrongful acts, but to 
satisfy a certain standard of conduct in attempting to prevent the commission of wrongful acts’, at p. 7. 
34 GPs 25-31.  
35 Ruggie, Framework, para. 87. 
36 Commentary to GP 25; Ruggie, Just Business, p. 196 (on ‘many victims […]’).    
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progress be made either actually to prevent or to prevent the appearance of 
corporate human rights abuses and to achieve ‘sustainable progress’.37 
The ‘corporate responsibility to respect human rights’ is the second pillar and 
has already been mentioned in the introduction to this paper. GP 11 states this 
‘means that [business enterprises] should avoid infringing on the human rights of 
others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they are 
involved’. As stated above, in the earlier iterations of the corporate responsibility 
to respect, Ruggie summarised it as ‘not to infringe on the rights of others – put 
simply, to do no harm’.38 The subsequent Guiding Principles distinguish between 
the situations where a business enterprise ‘causes’, ‘contributes’ or is ‘directly 
linked’ to adverse human rights impacts.39  
According to the SRSG’s commentary to GP 19, ‘where a business enterprise 
causes or may cause an adverse human rights impact, it should take the necessary 
steps to cease or prevent the impact’. Where instead a business enterprise 
‘contributes or may contribute to an adverse human rights impact, it should take 
the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to 
mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible’. Finally, where a 
business enterprise is only ‘directly linked’ to an adverse human rights impact 
through its ‘business relationships’, the business enterprise should exercise 
leverage to prevent or mitigate the adverse impact if it has leverage, should 
consider if it can increase its leverage, take into account the severity of the human 
rights impact when deciding how to act, and possibly consider terminating the 
relationship with the other entity. As well as deciding what will be ‘appropriate 
action’, whether a business enterprise causes, contributes or is merely directly 
linked to rights violations also affects the question of remediation, as introduced 
with the Guiding Principles. GP 22 states that business enterprises should 
remediate victims when they have caused or contributed to harms, but not when 
there is only a ‘direct link’ via business relationships to harm. 
Many commentators have drawn attention to the choice of language in the 
second pillar being the word ‘responsibility’, as opposed to the word ‘duty’ being 
selected for the first pillar.40 This is normally taken to indicate that the SRSG 
intended the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ to be extra-legal or non-legal. 
The corporate responsibility to respect can be taken to be extra-legal or non-legal 
in two different ways. Firstly, Ruggie emphasises that his framework and Guiding 
Principles are not intended to create new legal obligations for business enterprises 
at the international level: otherwise the new framework would replicate the 
                                                     
37 Ruggie, Framework, para. 9; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para 2; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 123; Ruggie, 
Guiding Principles, para. 6 (introduction) and General Principles. The appearance of corporate human 
rights abuses can be damaging: see discussion of reputational effects (Further steps, paras. 26). 
38 Ruggie, Framework, para. 24; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 3. 
39 GPs 13 and 19. 
40 Ruggie himself picks up on this distinction in Further Steps at para. 55.  
  
Astrid Sanders                                                                   The Impact of the ‘Ruggie Framework’  
 
 9
‘excesses’ of the Norms.41 Secondly, the corporate responsibility reflects the social 
expectations of companies (the company’s ‘social license to operate’).42 As 
identified by Ruggie, society’s expectations of companies might be more 
demanding of companies than their legal obligations.43  
However, even if the corporate responsibility to respect was primarily 
intended to be extra-legal or non-legal, that does not mean that business 
enterprises do not have any legal obligations to respect human rights. At the very 
least, they have obligations placed upon them in domestic laws, which may reflect 
‘elements’ of the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, even if the 
language of human rights is not explicitly used.44 A specific example, where human 
rights language is not expressly used but statutory instruments still reflect 
principles of human rights, would be anti-discrimination laws in the US and UK 
which require employers not to discriminate against workers on prohibited 
grounds and in particular types of way.45 To this end, Ruggie in his 2010 report 
emphasises that the corporate responsibility to respect is ‘not a law-free zone’.46 
Nor does the extra-legal sense of the corporate responsibility to respect mean that 
Ruggie would necessarily be adverse to domestic courts referring to his framework 
and using his framework to develop common law, as the ‘general principles’ of the 
Guiding Principles state that ‘nothing in these GPs should be read as […] limiting 
or undermining any legal obligations’ (albeit that clause continues ‘a ‘State may 
have undertaken or be subject to under international law with regard to human 
rights’). It might also be noted that, for these purposes, in his various reports as 
the SRSG, Ruggie notes developments at the domestic level, both judicial and 
non-judicial, potentially increasing the civil - and possibly even criminal - liability 
of businesses for human rights abuses at home and abroad, without expressing 
dissatisfaction at those developments.47 
The other criticism that tends to be made of the SRSG’s ‘corporate 
responsibility to respect’ is that it is predominantly negative.48 It will be 
remembered that GP 11 is expressed as an instruction not to ‘infringe on the 
rights of others’ and that, in the earlier articulations of the framework, Ruggie 
memorably summarised the corporate responsibility to respect as ‘put simply, to 
                                                     
41 General Principles in Guiding Principles. The word ‘excesses’ is used to describe the Norms in Ruggie, 
Interim Report at para. 59. 
42 Ruggie, Framework, para. 54; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 54; Ruggie, Operationalizing, paras. 46 and 48. 
43 Ruggie, Framework, para. 54; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 46. 
44 Ruggie, Further steps, para. 66. 
45 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 in the US and the Equality Act 2010 in the UK, 
which protect against, inter alia, direct and indirect discrimination, on prohibited grounds. GP 12 states 
that corporations should respect, ‘at a minimum’, the human rights expressed in the International Bill of 
Human Rights and, if not already covered, the ILO’s four ‘core’ labour rights or principles.   
46 Ruggie, Further steps, para. 66. 
47 Ruggie, Mapping, para. 90; Ruggie, Clarifying, pp. 9-16; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 75. Interestingly, 
note also Ruggie’s subsequent proposals for a new ‘international legal instrument’, (emphasis added) ‘clarifying 
standards […] where business enterprises cause or contribute to such abuses’ (Ruggie, Follow-Up, pp. 4-
5); discussed also in Ruggie, Just Business, p. 192 and pp. 200-201.  
48 Bilchitz describes the ‘‘negative’ core of the responsibility to respect’ (‘An Adequate Rubric’, 206). 
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do no harm’.49 It is generally accepted that states have legal obligations to respect 
(refrain from interfering), to protect (prevent violations by third parties) and to 
fulfil (take positive measures towards the full realization of rights) when it comes 
to human rights.50 The description of the corporate responsibility as an obligation 
of ‘respect’ and/or as negative is problematic for some human rights 
commentators, because they perceive this to represent a contraction of current 
international law.51 They believe that corporations, at international law, already 
owe legal obligations to respect and to protect human rights (as defined above),52 
or even owe legal obligations to respect, protect and also – within limits - to fulfil 
human rights.53  
There is not scope in this paper to enter into that highly contested and 
complicated debate, but what this paper would note is that it could be argued that 
Ruggie’s concept of corporate responsibility conflates the duty to respect and 
protect as used to describe a state’s obligation (although, as described above, the 
corporate responsibility to respect is defined by societal expectations unlike the 
state’s obligation to protect and respect which is a legal obligation at the 
international level).54 This is because Ruggie makes clear that businesses should be 
concerned not just with their own acts and omissions, but should also seek to 
prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts by third parties with whom they 
have a ‘business relationship’.55 Moreover, for the sake of completeness, it should 
also be noted that Ruggie himself has refuted the notion that the corporate 
responsibility to respect is entirely negative. Firstly, in his 2008 report, he states the 
corporate responsibility ‘is not merely a passive responsibility for firms but may 
entail positive steps - for example, a workplace anti-discrimination policy might 
require the company to adopt specific recruitment and training programmes’.56 
Secondly, subsequently, in response to a query by stakeholders that the 
‘responsibility to respect is a mere analogue to a “negative duty”’, Ruggie would 
seem to answer that it is ‘clear’ that the corporate responsibility to respect human 
                                                     
49 Ruggie, Framework, para. 24; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 3. 
50 Including in the Guiding Principles at General Principles (a). 
51 See, e.g., Jernej Letnar Černič, ‘Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: The 2010 UN Report by the UN 
Special Representative on Business and Human Rights’ (2010) 11 German Law Journal 1264. 
52 As suggested by, for example, Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 230-233. 
53 As suggested by, for example, Bilchitz in ‘An Adequate Rubric’, at 200 and 208-215. See, more 
generally, Steven R. Ratner, ‘Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 
111 Yale Law Journal 443; Nicola Jägers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: In Search of Accountability 
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2002); David Kinley and Junko Tadaki, ‘From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of 
Human Rights Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law’ (2004) 44 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 931. 
54 As noted by Bilchitz in ‘An Adequate Rubric’, 206-207. 
55 Ruggie, Framework, paras. 25, 57, 73-81; Ruggie, Clarifying, paras. 4, 19, 22-23, 26-72; Ruggie, 
Operationalizing, paras. 50-51, 75, 85; Ruggie, Further steps, paras. 58, 74; GPs 13 and 19. ‘Discharging 
the responsibility to respect requires [...] [in respect of] their activities and relationships’: Ruggie, 
Operationalizing, para. 85 (and, similarly, Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 23).  
56 Ruggie, Framework, para. 55. 
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rights requires positive acts.57 Interestingly, he identifies human rights due 
diligence and company grievance mechanisms as ‘by definition […] positive acts.’58 
As mentioned above, Ruggie has consistently explained that the way a 
company can ‘discharge’ the corporate responsibility to respect is through ‘due 
diligence’. In his 2008 report, Ruggie poses the questions, ‘how do companies 
know they respect human rights? Do they have systems in place enabling them to 
support the claim with any degree of confidence?’59 He answers, ‘most do not’ 
and, crucially, ‘what is required is due diligence’.60 Human rights due diligence, 
according to the SRSG, is the way ‘a company [can] know and show that it is 
meeting its responsibility to respect rights’.61 Knowing and showing is contrasted 
with naming and shaming.62 Ruggie refutes the suggestion that knowing and 
showing will lead to a risk of greater litigation against transnational corporations 
(because, for example, due diligence requires business enterprises to acknowledge 
potential or actual human rights abuses, which could ‘provide external parties with 
information they would not otherwise have had to use against the company’). 
Instead, knowing and showing, if ‘done properly’, will placate those who might 
otherwise begin legal claims or public campaigns (‘done properly, human rights 
due diligence should precisely create opportunities to mitigate risks and engage 
meaningfully with stakeholders’).63 Human rights due diligence, for Ruggie, will 
only increase the risk of litigation, if companies publicly misrepresent what they 
find in their due diligence or if they gain knowledge of possible human rights 
violations and do not act on that knowledge.64 In neither of the latter two 
situations, moreover, is a company carrying out human rights due diligence 
‘properly’, as the whole ‘point of human rights due diligence is to learn about risks 
that the company would then take action to mitigate, and not to ignore or 
misrepresent the findings.’65  
Ruggie has included human rights due diligence since his first articulation of 
the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework. In its first articulation, Ruggie 
                                                     
57 Ruggie, Further Steps, para. 59. 
58 Ibid. (The use of the word ‘positive acts’ by Ruggie might be thought to indicate a difference from tort 
laws, if positive duties are taken to be synonymous with exceptions to the general rule of no liability for 
omissions in tort law (thus, potentially, Ruggie routinely requires something, when it is only exceptionally 
required in tort laws). However, the US Third Restatement of Torts on Physical and Emotional Harm 
takes a wide view of ‘acts’ at section three, section seven and the scope note to chapter seven, and in 
most of the cases to date, the allegation has been that the business enterprise has somehow ‘created a risk 
of harm’ (Third Restatement, section 3) even if the business enterprise has not been the primary 
wrongdoer, by, for example, asking security services for help, by contracting with a risky supplier, by 
devising a relevant policy but not implementing it, and so forth). 
59 Ruggie, Framework, para. 26. 
60 Ibid. See also Ruggie, Just Business, p. 99. 
61 Ruggie, Further steps, paras. 80 and 83.  
62 Ibid. 
63 Ruggie, Operationalizing, paras. 80-83. 
64 Ibid, para. 82. (‘Moreover, recent experience shows that other social actors are quite capable of 
concluding and stating publicly that a company facing criticism has undertaken good faith efforts to avoid 
human rights harm, and that transparency in acknowledging inadvertent problems can work in its favour.’ 
para. 83). 
65 Ibid. 
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explains that it ‘describes the steps a company must take to become aware of, 
prevent and address adverse human rights impacts’.66 The Guiding Principles 
provide a more sophisticated definition of due diligence as whereby business 
enterprises ‘identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their 
adverse human rights impacts’.67 Again, since the SRSG’s first articulation of due 
diligence in the 2008 report, Ruggie notes that due diligence will vary according to 
the country context, the company’s own activities and the company’s 
relationships.68 It is stated to be ‘inductive and fact-based’.69 Ruggie in 2008 also 
identifies four key aspects to human rights due diligence: a human rights policy, 
human rights impact assessments, integration of the human rights policy 
throughout the enterprise and, finally, tracking and monitoring.70 The reference to 
human rights due diligence varying with the context,  remains in the Guiding 
Principles, as does reference to the core elements of human rights due diligence.71 
The main difference is that, in the Guiding Principles, as foreshadowed by the 
2010 report, (which observes differences between financial due diligence and 
human rights due diligence, and which will be significant below),72 there is more 
emphasis on stakeholder involvement throughout the human rights due diligence 
process and more emphasis on transparency or communication of impacts.73 
 
 
 
3. TYPES OF ‘DUE DILIGENCE’ 
It is normally assumed that Ruggie’s concept of ‘human rights due diligence’ is 
taken from due diligence as applied in the financial or corporate context. 
According to Sherman III and Kehr, ‘due diligence is a familiar business tool, 
designed to enable companies to reduce and risk liability. It requires companies to 
ask tough questions about the risks of major transactions, projects, and ongoing 
operations.’74 The same authors refer to due diligence ‘processes’ ‘such as[…] the 
internal controls derived from COSO (the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission), as embodied in Section 404 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, and the enterprise wide risk management processes set forth 
in the UK Turnbull Report’.75 Similar to other commentators, they note the 
                                                     
66 Ruggie, Framework, para. 56.  
67 GP 17. 
68 Ruggie, Framework, para. 57 (and Ruggie, Clarifying, paras. 19-23; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 50; 
Ruggie, Further steps, para. 58). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid, paras. 59-64 (and Ruggie, Further steps, para. 83). 
71 GPs 14-23. 
72 Ruggie, Further steps, paras, 84-85; see also Ruggie, Just Business, pp. 99-100. 
73 GPs 16, 18, 20 and 21. 
74 John F. Sherman III and Amy Lehr, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence: Is It Too Risky?’ Working Paper 
No. 55, Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2010), p. 3. 
75 Ibid 4-5. 
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similarity of the process of due diligence suggested by Ruggie and as contained in 
corporate governance laws.76 The obligation in both is ‘collection and utilization 
of information, risk assessment, reasonable decision-making procedures, 
monitoring, reporting, and adjustments in corporate policy when and where 
necessary’, as detailed in the human rights context in the Guiding Principles from 
Principles 17 to 24.77  
Indeed, Ruggie himself encourages commentators to make this analogy. As 
early as the 2008 report, Ruggie notes that companies typically already have 
‘comparable processes’, as required by domestic laws in many countries, to ‘assess 
and manage financial related risks’ and repeatedly discusses whether human rights 
due diligence should ideally be ‘free-standing’ or instead merely incorporated 
within ‘broader enterprise risk-management systems’.78 As well, in his subsequent 
monograph, Ruggie specifically identifies that he ‘[drew] on these established 
practices’ of ‘transactional due diligence’ by companies to formulate his concept of 
human rights due diligence.79  
There are, however, three caveats, which suggest that the overlap, although 
strong, is not complete. Firstly, Ruggie stresses that human rights due diligence is 
‘ongoing’.80 It is different from ‘transactional’ due diligence, which may only be 
required on a one-off basis before a particular transaction, such as a merger or 
acquisition, is carried out.81 Ruggie describes human rights due diligence instead as 
a ‘comprehensive, proactive attempt to uncover human rights risks, actual and 
potential, over the entire life cycle of a project or business activity’.82  
Secondly, more obviously in his later reports to the UN Human Rights 
Council, Ruggie notes some important differences between commercial due 
diligence and human rights due diligence. As noted above, human rights due 
diligence, in addition, requires ‘engagement and dialogue’ with, and ‘transparency 
and accountability’ to ‘affected individuals and communities’.83 Ruggie describes 
‘human rights risk management’ as different from ‘commercial, technical and even 
political risk management in that it involves rights-holders. Therefore, it is an 
inherently dialogical process that involves engagement and communication, not 
simply calculating probabilities.’84  
Thirdly, another way in which human rights due diligence is different from 
normal corporate due diligence is that Ruggie rejects the suggestion made, 
                                                     
76 Ibid 4. On the analogy between corporate due diligence and Ruggie’s concept, see also, e.g. Tineke 
Lambooy, ‘Corporate Due Diligence as a Tool to Respect Human Rights’ (2010) 28 Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights 404 and Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘Concept of Due Diligence’. 
77 Lucien J. Dhooge, ‘Due Diligence as a Defense to Corporate Liability Pursuant to the ATS’ (2008) 22 
Emory International Law Review 455, 470-471. 
78 Ruggie, Framework, para. 56; Ruggie, Operationalizing, paras. 26, 77-81; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 
81, Ruggie, Guiding Principles, commentary to GP 17. 
79 Ruggie, Just Business, p. 99. 
80 Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 71; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 84; GP 17(c). 
81 Ruggie, Just Business, p. 99. 
82 Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 71. 
83 Ruggie, Further steps, paras. 84-85; (see also Ruggie, Just Business, pp. 99-100). 
84 Ibid. 
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academically, that carrying out human rights due diligence should be a defence to 
claims under the ATS in the same way that commercial due diligence provides a 
defence against mismanagement claims by shareholders. In an article for the 
Emory International Law Review, Dhooge had argued that the normal ‘business 
judgment rule’ ought to apply, so that ‘transnational corporations would be 
shielded from liability for decisions and actions [under the ATS] that ultimately 
resulted in human rights abuses as long as the decision-making process included a 
due diligence element designed to identify and avoid such abuses’.85 Ruggie’s 
response was that ‘the Special Representative would not support proposals that 
conducting human rights due diligence, by itself, should automatically and fully 
absolve a company from ATS or similar liability’.86 The authors Sherman III and 
Lehr were referred to above. Bonnitcha and McCorquodale have observed that 
Sherman III was one of the lawyers who worked on Ruggie’s team.87 Albeit not 
writing on the SRSG’s behalf, Sherman III (and Lehr), have explained more fully 
why Dhooge’s argument should be rejected. Interestingly, ATS claims are stated to 
be ‘very [or markedly] different from claims made by investors that the company 
mismanaged the business, resulting in financial loss’ as, notably, ‘compared to 
investors, the victims of human rights abuses are far more vulnerable, and the 
harm is more permanent and shocking to the conscience’.88  
Nor is the overlap between corporate due diligence and human rights due 
diligence necessarily exclusive. On the one hand, some commentators have 
explored the view that there is an analogy with ‘due diligence’ as required by states 
when they are required to prevent against or respond to human rights violations 
by third parties.89 The language of due diligence was used, for example, by the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights in this sense in the Velasquez Rodriguez 
case.90 On the other hand, others authors have noted a possible analogy with 
negligence law in domestic jurisdictions, albeit with one exception, they have not 
developed that other possible analogy in detail. For example, Sherman III and 
Lehr suggest that ‘it is not inconceivable that human rights due diligence may be 
cited by a court as a standard of care in a negligence case’.91 Bonnitcha and 
McCorquodale, as another example, quote Hanquin for the proposition that ‘due 
diligence’ is often thought to have its origins in the English common law tort of 
negligence.92 Van Dam, finally, states that ‘carrying out [Ruggie’s] ‘due diligence is 
                                                     
85 Dhooge, ‘Due Diligence as a Defense’. 
86 Ruggie, Further steps, para. 86. 
87 Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘Concept of Due Diligence’, p. 12. 
88 Sherman III and Lehr, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence’, p. 18. 
89 E.g. Lambooy, ‘Corporate Due Diligence’ and also Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘Concept of Due 
Diligence’ p. 14 (and pp. 5-8). 
90 Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4 (1988). 
91 Sherman III and Lehr, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence’, p. 12. 
92 ‘Concept of Due Diligence’, p. 4: citing Xue Hanquin, Transboundary Damage in International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 162. 
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akin to acting as a reasonable man (company) in order to avoid damage who can 
be foreseeably affected by the company’s activities’.93 
Mares is the one author who has discussed in more detail whether there is a 
possible overlap between negligence laws and Ruggie’s concept of corporate 
responsibility.94 However, Mares approaches this question from a different angle 
to this author. Mares perceives that the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles 
are lacking in a conceptual basis and that, if there is an analogy with negligence 
laws, negligence laws can provide the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles 
with missing legitimacy.95 However, for this author, the legitimacy of the Ruggie 
Framework and Guiding Principles is, more simply, found in the universal or near 
universal acceptance of, firstly, the Ruggie Framework and then the Guiding 
Principles, by all relevant actors.96 Rather than negligence laws providing the 
Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles with legitimacy, this author starts from 
the opposite position that the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles may be 
able to add legitimacy, or provide support for plaintiffs bringing negligence claims 
in state or domestic laws against transnational corporations for alleged corporate-
related human rights abuses overseas. 
 
 
 
4. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES WITH THE TORT OF 
NEGLIGENCE 
There are indeed similarities between the tort of negligence and the ‘corporate 
responsibility to respect’ as conceptualised by Ruggie. References in the reports of 
the SRSG variously to avoiding ‘infringing on the rights of others’, to ‘doing no 
harm’, ‘acting with due diligence’ (which sounds remarkably like an instruction to 
act with reasonable care), a balancing approach, and references to the ordinary or 
reasonable person are all obviously familiar to the tort of negligence. 
GP 11 tells business enterprises they should avoid infringing on the rights of 
others, whereas in earlier reports, Ruggie stated that the corporate responsibility to 
respect ‘in essence means to act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the 
rights of others’.97 Similarly, in the seminal case of Donoghue v. Stevenson in the UK, 
the House of Lords defined the tort of negligence as ‘the rule that you are to love 
your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour […] You 
must take reasonable care to avoid acts and omissions which you can reasonably 
foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour’ (and, of course, ‘neighbour’ is 
                                                     
93 Cees Van Dam, Call for Evidence: Business and Human Rights (memorandum submitted to UK 
Human Rights Joint Committee, May 2009), p.1. 
94 Radu Mares, ‘A Gap in the Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights’ (2011) 36 Monash Uni 
Law Rev 33 and ‘The Development of the ‘Responsibility to Respect: Why the Core Company Should Act 
When Affiliates Infringe Human Rights’ in Mares, UN Guiding Principles. 
95 Mares, ‘A Gap’. 
96 C.f. possible developments more recently at UN Human Rights Council, noted at fn. 23. 
97 Ruggie, Framework, para. 24; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 3. 
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not meant in a literal sense). Neighbours, for Lord Atkin, are ‘persons who are so 
closely and directly affected by my acts that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts and 
omissions which are called in question’.98 Stakeholders, as defined by Ruggie, 
would surely fall within this category. 
Ruggie, at times, again refers to the corporate responsibility to respect as ‘to 
act with due diligence’ and also refers to due diligence as taking ‘reasonable steps 
[…] to become aware of, prevent and address adverse impacts’.99 Similarly, the 
definition of negligence in the new US Third Restatement of Torts on Physical 
and Emotional Harm (hereafter ‘Third Restatement’), at section three, is that ‘a 
person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all 
the circumstances’.  
Ruggie provides a definition of due diligence in his 2008 and 2009 reports 
which measures due diligence against the behaviour reasonably expected from or 
ordinarily exercised by a person (who seeks to satisfy a legal requirement or to 
discharge an obligation).100 Similarly, the commentary to section three of the Third 
Restatement goes on to state that the standard of behaviour expected in 
negligence cases is the standard of the ‘reasonable person’. English negligence law 
is also replete with references to the ‘reasonable person’ or ‘ordinary person’ when 
deciding if there has been a breach of duty, although in the English cases that 
person is sometimes more specifically, and more characteristically, referred to as 
the ‘man on the Clapham omnibus’ or ‘woman on the [London] underground’.101  
Whilst discussing the breach of duty analysis, GP 19 in addition seems to 
incorporate a type of ‘balancing approach’ which, of course, is the approach taken 
at the breach stage in negligence cases in both the US and UK.102 ‘Appropriate 
action’, according to GP 19, will depend on, amongst others, the ‘severity of the 
abuse’. Severity of harm is also relevant to the first stage of the balancing approach 
in negligence cases, as the first stage is to consider the magnitude of the risk, 
which is a composite term for the probability of harm occurring and the likely 
severity of harm.103 Then, the second stage in the balancing approach in 
negligence cases is to consider the ‘burden of precautions’ to eliminate or reduce 
                                                     
98 [1932] AC 562, 580. Lord Atkin referred positively to US cases, describing MacPherson v Buick Motor Co 
217 NY 382 (1916) as ‘illuminating’ at 598. Similarly, Lord MacMillan, for the majority, also referred to 
US cases, at 617-618. (However, c.f. dissenting opinion of Lord Buckmaster at 576).    
99 Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 23; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 2; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 1. 
100 Ruggie, Framework, fn. 22; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 71. 
101 ‘Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something 
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do’, in Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co 156 ER 1047 
(1856). (On the ‘Clapham omnibus’, see the ‘classical’ statement in Bolam v. Freiern Hospital Management 
Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 586; updated to ‘underground’ in [2002] ACD 70). 
102 Third Restatement, s. 3 and comment e (on US) and Reporters’ Note, comment d (on English law).  
103 Third Restatement, s. 3, comment d.  
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the risk of harm, and ultimately to weigh these two factors against each other.104 
Even if the burden of precautions is regarded as purely economic which, however, 
the commentary to the Third Restatement would suggest is not the case, the 
financial cost of precautions is at least partly relevant for Ruggie as the 
commentary to GP 19 states that a relevant factor is ‘how crucial’, presumably 
economically, ‘the relationship is to the enterprise’.105 The commentary to the 
Third Restatement, moreover, expresses the idea that the ‘balancing approach’ in 
negligence cases means looking at the advantages versus disadvantages of conduct, 
which is exactly the same sort of exercise that the commentary to GP 19 
recommends.  
It might, finally, be argued that the Guiding Principles have increased the 
similarity of the Ruggie Framework to negligence law. Before the Guiding 
Principles, the SRSG’s reports had mentioned that business enterprises should 
‘address adverse impacts’ but did not specify in detail what action should be taken. 
‘Remediation’ was briefly mentioned, however, more so in the context of the third 
pillar, when discussing company grievance mechanisms.106 By GP 22’s emphasis 
on ‘remediation’ and, moreover, under the second pillar, can only increase the 
similarities with tort laws, as one of the primary purposes of tort laws as a whole is 
surely to provide compensation to victims of tortious conduct.107 
As conventionally understood, the tort of negligence involves fault-based 
liability. Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, therefore, would seem to question the 
analogy drawn thus far in this paper between negligence law and Ruggie’s 
corporate responsibility to respect. They suggest that fault is only relevant, in the 
Guiding Principles, with regard to a business enterprise’s responsibility for adverse 
human rights impacts caused by third parties (when there is a ‘business 
relationship’ between the third party and the business enterprise in question).108 
They state that, in comparison, liability in the Guiding Principles is strict when it 
comes to the business enterprise’s own adverse human rights impacts.109 They 
draw upon a difference in language in the two clauses of GP 13. GP 13(a) states 
that business enterprises ‘should avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities’, rather than business enterprises 
should take reasonable care to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human 
rights impacts through their own activities. By contrast, GP 13(b) states that 
business enterprises should ‘seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts that are directly linked to their operations […] even if they have not 
                                                     
104 Third Restatement, s. 3 and ibid. ‘In every case of a foreseeable risk, it is a matter of balancing the risk 
against the measures necessary to eliminate it’, in Latimer v. AEC [1952] 2 QB 701, 711). 
105 ‘The burden of precautions can take a wide variety of forms’ (ibid). See also Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC 
850, 867 (but c.f. economic accounts, as discussed at Reporters’ Note, comment d). 
106 Ruggie, Framework, para. 82; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 83 and 92. 
107 Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation’, 3. More generally, see Glanville Williams, ‘The Aims of the Law of Tort’ 
[1951] Current Legal Problems 137 and Tony Honoré, ‘The Morality of Tort Law’ in David G. Owen (ed), 
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 75. 
108 Bonnitcha and McCorquodale, ‘Concept of Due Diligence’, pp. 9-14. 
109 Ibid. 
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contributed to those impacts’, which would imply that ‘trying’ and, therefore, fault 
is relevant for a business enterprise’s responsibility for third party impacts.  
However, even if strictly speaking this is true of the wording in GP 13, this is 
not true of the earlier reports that predate the Guiding Principles. As noted above, 
the earlier reports refer repeatedly to ‘acting with due diligence to avoid infringing 
on the rights of others’ and discuss the ‘reasonable steps’ companies are required 
to take.110 If the Guiding Principles were intended to signify arguably such a 
radical change, surely this would have been indicated either in the foreword or in 
the commentary. The commentary, in fact, to GP 13 is comparatively short, and 
mentions nothing about the presence or absence of a fault standard. Moreover, 
and surely decisively, Ruggie’s own introduction to the Guiding Principles again 
defines the corporate responsibility to respect as business enterprises should ‘act 
with due diligence’ to avoid infringing on the rights of others.111 
Another argument that might be voiced against the negligence analogy would 
be the general rule that parties are only responsible for their own behaviour in the 
tort of negligence and are not responsible for the behaviour of third parties.112 
Against this, the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles tell business 
enterprises that they should intervene when they have not caused or contributed 
to adverse impacts, to try to prevent or mitigate adverse impacts caused by third 
parties (as elaborated in the commentary to GP 19).  
On the other hand, the principle of remediation in GP 22 only applies when 
the business enterprise causes or contributes to adverse impacts. However, even 
here, similarities between the tort of negligence, on the one hand, and the Ruggie 
Framework and Guiding Principles, on the other hand, may be apparent upon 
closer inspection. Namely, there are significant exceptions to the general rule 
against liability for acts of third parties, both in the US and UK. McIvor 
summarises these exceptions as falling within two different groups: firstly, when 
there is a relationship of protection (between the claimant and defendant) and, 
secondly, separately, when there is a relationship of control (of the defendant over 
a third party).113 In the UK, Lord Goff usefully noted the list of exceptions 
judicially in Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation, whereas in the US, the list of 
exceptions is contained in the Third Restatement at chapter seven on affirmative 
duties.114 Thus, similar to the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, 
defendants can be held liable (if they have not acted with reasonable care) even if 
they have not caused or contributed to the harm but in negligence, if, for example, 
they have a ‘special relationship’ with the claimant, if there is an ‘assumption of 
responsibility’ by the defendant, if they have a ‘special relationship’ with the third 
                                                     
110 Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 23; Ruggie, Operationalizing, para. 2; Ruggie, Further steps, para. 1. 
111 Para. 6. 
112 E.g. ‘it is well recognised that there is no general duty of care to prevent third parties from causing 
such damage’, in Smith v. Littlewoods Organisation [1987] AC 241, 270 (Lord Goff). 
113 Claire McIvor, Third Party Liability in Tort (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), p. 12. 
114 [1987] AC 241, 272. 
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party, if the defendant’s prior conduct creates a continuing risk of physical harm, 
and if the defendant is responsible for a state of danger or for property that may 
be exploited by a third party or used by a third party to cause damage, amongst 
others.115  
The question thus becomes if the exceptions to the ‘no liability for the acts of 
third parties’ rule in negligence laws are as extensive as the responsibility Ruggie 
places upon business enterprises for the acts of third parties. Firstly, significantly, 
in the Guiding Principles, it is conceded that, as a matter of practicality, business 
enterprises do not have to seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights 
impacts by all third parties with whom the business enterprise has a business 
relationship. According to the commentary to GP 17, where business enterprises 
have ‘large numbers of entities in their value chains’ they should ‘identify general 
areas where the risk of adverse human rights impacts is most significant, whether 
due to certain suppliers’ or clients’ operating context, the particular operations, 
products or services involved, or relevant considerations, and prioritize these for 
human rights due diligence’.116 Thus, the difference between the Guiding 
Principles and the tort of negligence is that the selection of which third party a 
business enterprise will be liable for depends in the Guiding Principles on where 
adverse impacts are likely to be most serious, whereas under the tort of negligence, 
it will depend on the closeness of the relationship between the business enterprise 
and either affected individuals or with offending entities.  
On the other hand, the selection may still possibly be similar under both. 
Ruggie in 2008 identified that ‘the required actions regarding the human rights 
impact of a subsidiary may differ from those taken in response to potential or 
actual impacts of suppliers several layers removed’.117 Similarly, in negligence laws, 
when looking at the second type of special relationship based on the defendant’s 
control over the entity posing risks, it is more likely that there will be this type of 
special relationship between a parent company and the first layer of companies, as 
the parent company’s level of control over companies in the corporate group may 
become more attenuated with each layer. However, it is not beyond the realms of 
possibility that the first type of special relationship in negligence laws, based on 
the relationship between the defendant and claimant and specifically the claimant’s 
weakness or vulnerability vis-à-vis the defendant, will be satisfied beyond the first 
layer of companies if, for example, a parent company assumes for itself control of 
human rights matters for the whole corporate group.118 The parent company 
might develop a group-wide human rights policy and take an active role in 
                                                     
115 Ibid, and Third Restatement, s. 39 (duty based on prior conduct creating a risk of harm), s. 40 (duty 
based on special relationship with another), s. 41 (duty to third parties based on special relationship with 
person posing risks). (See also possibly Third Restatement, chapter 10).  
116 And GP 24. 
117 Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 24. 
118 As potentially encouraged by Ruggie in an earlier draft of the commentary to GP 12 (equivalent but 
different sentiment expressed in now GP 14): ‘A corporate group may consider itself to be a single 
business enterprise, in which case the responsibility to respect human rights attaches to the group as a 
whole and encompasses both the corporate parent and its subsidiaries and affiliates [...]’. 
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ensuring the implementation of that policy, in the same way that in the English 
case law, parent companies have taken the lead on health and safety for the 
corporate group.119 Even though US courts to date have not accepted this 
argument, it is not inconceivable that the parent company in this situation could 
owe a duty of care in tort, albeit a narrower duty, based on its voluntary 
assumption of responsibility, to employees of suppliers lower down the chain 
(especially if there is, for example, a group-wide human rights officer).120 
Even if there is not a significant difference between responsibility for third 
parties in negligence laws and under the Ruggie Framework; there is, however, 
another way in which the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles diverge from 
negligence laws. As noted above, as prefaced by the 2010 report, the Guiding 
Principles emphasise the importance of stakeholder involvement throughout the 
‘life cycle’ of due diligence121 GP 18 tells business enterprises they should ‘involve 
meaningful consultation with potentially affected groups and other relevant 
stakeholders’ when gauging human rights risks and GP 20 advises them to ‘draw 
on feedback’ from those directly affected when ‘[verifying] whether adverse 
impacts are being addressed’. In comparison, this sort of input is not normally 
required or expected by courts in negligence cases, either when asking if there has 
been a breach or in formulating remedies. However, arguably, if it were, this 
would increase the empowerment or voice function of tort, which some 
commentators suggest is or should be a goal of tort laws.122 
To draw together these similarities, it is helpful to think of a timeline. The 
Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles instruct business enterprises how they 
should act generally. If harm does not arise, then the tort of negligence will not be 
relevant, beyond the deterrent function of tort. It is only if ‘harm’ subsequently 
arises, which Ruggie himself concedes will inevitably happen on some 
occasions,123 that the tort of negligence may be relevant (as the so-called ‘gist’ of 
negligence is damage).124 If a claim is brought in negligence, a court will look 
backwards at the defendant’s behaviour leading up to the harm and, as will be 
argued below, might henceforth assess whether there has been a tortious lack of 
reasonable care exercised, with reference to the standards set in the Ruggie 
Framework and UN Guiding Principles. 
 
                                                     
119 Connelly v. RTZ Corp [1998] AC 854; Lubbe v. Cape [2000] 1 WLR 1545; Chandler v. Cape. 
120 Doe v. Wal-Mart 572 F 3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009). The English Court of Appeal in Chandler confirmed that 
the parent company was liable in negligence to the employee of a subsidiary, but the duty was more 
limited (para. 66). The facts of that case included that there was a group-wide medical advisor. 
121 Ruggie, Further Steps, paras, 84-85. 
122 E.g. Allen Linden, ‘Tort Law as Ombudsman’ (1973) 51 Canadian Bar Review 155 (and ‘Reconsidering 
Tort Law as Ombudsman’ in Freda M. Steel and Sandra Rodgers-Magnet (eds), Issues in Tort Law 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1983); Perry Ronen, ‘Empowerment and Tort Law (2009) 76 Tennessee Law Review 
959. 
123 Ruggie, Framework, para. 26; Ruggie, Guiding Principles, para 6 (intro); Ruggie, Just Business, p. 102. 
124 Gregg v. Scott [2005] UKHL 2, [2005] 2 AC 176, paras. 99 and 193 (for practical application, see Rothwell 
v. Chemical and Insulating Co [2007] UKHL 39, [2008] 1 AC 281). Third Restatement, s. 4. 
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5. RELEVANCE OF THE TORT OF NEGLIGENCE 
As noted above, the majority of transnational human rights litigation against 
transnational corporations to date has taken place in the US and UK, although 
numerically the number of cases brought in the US dwarfs the number of cases 
brought in the UK.125 In the UK, and indeed in other common law jurisdictions 
without a statutory equivalent of the ATS, cases have been brought in ‘ordinary’ 
tort law instead.126 Indeed, even in the US, it has been common to pair an ATS 
claim against a business enterprise for corporate-related human rights harms with 
state common law tort claims (in previous cases, such as for the torts of battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, negligence, negligent hiring and negligent supervision).127 Hence, if there 
is an overlap between the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles and the tort 
of negligence, this could be very significant for the future of transnational human 
rights litigation outside the US but also, especially after recent developments, in 
the US as well.  
Interestingly, Goldhaber has recently argued that transnational human rights 
litigation has, in fact, been more successful in the UK than in the US.128 He bases 
this on a higher proportion of litigants receiving a ‘payout’ in the UK than in the 
US and on the rates of settlements being proportionally higher in the UK. 
According to Goldhaber, 80 per cent of ‘UK business human rights disputes 
litigated to a full conclusion have resulted in a payout’ in comparison to ‘9.5 per 
cent’ for ‘US corporate alien tort suits’: in other words, a difference of 70 per 
cent.129 Goldhaber also compares the highest rates of settlement in each 
jurisdiction: reportedly, $30 million in the US Unocal settlement in contrast with 
£30 million in the UK Trafigura agreement (‘equivalent to $48 million US’).130  
On the other hand, as Goldhaber himself concedes, there have only been a 
handful of transnational human rights claims in the UK and there may not be 
many more such new claims in the future after very recent legislative reforms, 
referred to here in the introduction, that change the rules on recovery of costs in 
                                                     
125 Drimmer notes there have been 180 alien tort disputes filed against business entities (according to 
Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights’, 128), in comparison to 5-10 negligence claims in the UK. In 
comparison, Ruggie refers to ‘more than fifty cases’ under the ATS in Further steps, para. 75.   
126 The UK Human Rights Joint Committee did not favour the adoption of an ATS equivalent in the UK 
(Any of our business? Human Rights and the UK Private Sector, HL 66/ HC 401, para. 300). However, 
on attempts to create a new Canadian equivalent of the ATS, see Bill C-323 (introduced as of 16 October 
2013: available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Bill=C323&Parl=41&Ses=2  
(accessed 1 December 2013).  
127 Paul Hoffmann and Beth Stephens, ‘International Human Rights Cases Under State Law and in State 
Courts’ (2013) 3 UC Irvine Law Review 9, 15-17. Notable examples include Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum 
226 F 3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2000); Doe v. Unocal 2002 WL 33944506 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002); Bowoto v. Chevron 621 
F 3d 1116 (9th Cir 2010) (discussing previous jury trial); Doe v. Exxon Mobil 654 F 3d 11 (DC Cir. 2011) 
(and 527 Fed Appx 7 (DC Cir. 2013); Sarei v. Rio Tinto 671 F 3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (but 722 F 3d 1109 
(9th Cir 2013). 
128 Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights’. (See also Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation’). 
129 Ibid 131 and 136. 
130 Ibid 129-131 and 136. 
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civil cases.131 Goldhaber states that only five cases have been litigated to 
completion to date in the UK whereas one of the partners at the only law firm in 
the UK to have pursued these claims wrote in 2011 that there had been eight such 
cases at that point (some still ongoing).132  That same partner also referred to the 
relative simplicity of ‘ordinary’ domestic tort complaints by contrast with claims 
under the ATS and to ‘more favourable rules of jurisdiction’ across the EU, for 
example, preventing an English court considering the doctrine of FNC (as above) 
even in transnational cases when the defendant is ‘domiciled’ in the UK.133 
One recent very important development in the UK was the case of Chandler v. 
Cape in 2012.134 As acknowledged by the English Court of Appeal, ‘this is one of 
the first cases in which an employee has established at trial liability to him on the 
part of his employer’s parent company, and thus this appeal is of some importance 
not only to the parties but to other cases’.135 Thus, unlike many of the judgments 
to date in transnational human rights litigation in both the US and UK, this was 
not a judgment in preliminary proceedings or on procedural matters: it was a 
judgment on the merits.136 Arden LJ confirmed the parent company, on these 
facts, was directly liable (thus unlike much of the ATS litigation, not alleging 
secondary liability) for its own acts and omissions in respect of health and safety 
matters with regards to the employee of a subsidiary, and set out broader guidance 
as to when it will be apt to recognise this parent company responsibility.137 
Although the case was not transnational, as both the subsidiary and parent 
company were both based in the UK, the broader guidance is not geographically 
limited and could potentially be applicable to relationships between parent 
companies and subsidiaries abroad in transnational corporate groups. Indeed, in 
two of the previous cases in the UK that were truly ‘transnational’ which settled or 
were time-barred (Connelly v. RTZ Corporation and Lubbe and others v. Cape), the facts 
as alleged would appear definitely to meet and satisfy Arden LJ’s guidance in 
Chandler.138  
                                                     
131 Above (n. 8). 
132 Goldhaber, ‘Corporate Human Rights’, 136; Meeran, ‘Tort Litigation’, 4. The UK cases are Connelly; 
Lubbe; Ngcobo v. Thor Chemicals [1995] WL 1082070; Sithole v. Thor Chemicals 2000 WL 1421183; Guerrero v. 
Monterrico Metals [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB); Motto v. Trafigura [2012] 1 WLR 657; Bodo Community v. RDS; 
(unreported); Vava (plus Chandler as will be described below). 
133 Above (n. 11). In Daimlerchrysler (n. 13), Justice Ginsburg referred to the concept of domicile used ‘in 
the European Union’ (at [12]), which would facially seem to be similar to the ‘exemplar bases Goodyear 
identified’ that were described earlier in the judgment (at [10]). Justice Sotomayor observed that FNC 
would be available, as another ‘judicial doctrine available to mitigate any resulting unfairness’, at 771. 
134 [2012] EWCA Civ 525, [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
135 Para. 2. 
136 Joseph, Transnational Human Rights Litigation, pp. 73 and 145. Exceptions in the US include Bowoto and 
Romero v. Drummond 552 F 3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing previous jury trial): however, both were 
trial verdicts for the defendant, after consideration by a jury. 
137 Para. 80 (and paras. 72-80). 
138 E.g. Connelly (HL) 864 and Lubbe (HL) 1550-1551. As these were decisions on preliminary issues 
(specifically on whether or not to grant a stay for FNC), ‘[we] are not at present in any position to form a 
judgment’ ‘on the strength of the plaintiff’s claim’ (Connelly (HL) 871). 
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Common law tort is not, however, only of interest outside the US. After the 
US Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, there seems to be 
consensus among the US academy that there will henceforth be a renewed focus 
on state common law tort claims as a vehicle for transnational human rights 
litigation in the US.139 The US Supreme Court in Kiobel, in sum, found that the 
normal presumption against the extraterritorial application of domestic statutes 
also applies to the ATS.140 An exception would seem to have been stated by the 
majority, where claims ‘touch and concern’ the US sufficiently to displace the 
presumption.141 However, in the subsequent case law, albeit mostly only at federal 
District Court level so far, arguments that the ‘touch and concern’ exception is 
met have tended to be rejected and, moreover, confusion expressed judicially 
about the ‘touch and concern’ exception.142  
Thus, based on the current US jurisprudence at least, it seems very unlikely 
that ATS claims in transnational human rights litigation, where the adverse human 
rights impacts have occurred abroad,143 will be allowed to proceed, leaving 
common law state claims as the most promising option for affected individuals 
and groups. It should, however, also be noted that some commentators have 
pointed to the disadvantages of state common law claims. These include the idea 
that expressing human rights violations as ‘garden variety torts’ downgrades the 
nature of the wrong,144 and concerns that state courts are not as well equipped as 
federal courts to receive these claims.145 This goes back to Neuborne’s well-known 
critique of state courts that they have less ‘technical competence’, a different 
‘psychological set’ and are subject to ‘majoritarian pressure’.146 
 
 
 
6. POSSIBLE IMPACT OF THE RUGGIE FRAMEWORK AND 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
In transnational human rights litigation in the US and UK against transnational 
corporations subsequent to the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, it 
would appear that there have only been two fleeting references to the SRSG in 
                                                     
139 Above (n. 22). 
140 133 S. Ct 1659 (2013). 
141 1669 (for completeness, it should be noted that the ‘minority’ expressed a wider view at 1671).  
142 E.g. Mohammadi v. Iran 947 F Supp 2d 48 (DDC. 2013) (description of ‘high bar’ at 17); Al-Shimari v 
CACI 2013 WL 3229720 (ED Va. 2013); Giraldo v. Drummond 2013 WL 3873960 (ND Ala. 2013) (no 
‘road map’ on touch and concern question, at 5, and description of Kiobel as ‘seismic shift’ at 1). For rare 
appellate court authority thus far, and following the same trend, see Balintolo v. Daimler AG 727 F 3d 174 
(2nd Cir 2013) (and ‘if all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under 
Kiobel’). Cases allowed to proceed: Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively 2013 WL 4130756 (D Mass. 2013); 
Mwani v. Laden 947 F Supp 2d 1 (DDC 2013).  
143 Balintolo (ibid); Ben-Haim v. Neeman 2013 WL 5878913 (3rd Cir. 2013) at 2. 
144 Xuncax v. Gramajo 886 F Supp 162 (D Mass. 1995), 183. 
145 E.g. Austen L. Parrish, ‘State Court International Human Rights Litigation: A Concerning Trend?’ 
(2013) 3 UC Irvine Law Review 25. 
146 Burt Neuborne, ‘The Myth of Parity’ 1976 (90) Harvard Law Review 1105, 1118-1128. C.f. theorists 
arguing state courts may, in fact, be preferable (see citations in fn. 2 of Parrish, ibid). 
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judgments.147 This might be considered surprising, given the ubiquity of the 
Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles and, for example, the fact that the UK 
‘National Contact Point’ under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, notably before the most recent revision of the OECD Guidelines that 
now do refer to the SRSG, voluntarily chose to incorporate the Ruggie 
Framework in its decisions, even though the complaints turned on, at that time, 
autonomous provisions of the OECD Guidelines.148 
There are a number of possible ways in which the Ruggie Framework and 
Guiding Principles could impact on negligence claims. Firstly, in the UK where 
the duty of care question tends to be the main issue in these cases, the Ruggie 
Framework and Guiding Principles might inspire a broader formulation of the 
duty of care as, for example, by adapting GP 11, a ‘duty to act with due diligence 
to avoid infringing on the human rights of others where infringements result in 
harm’. In the salient English cases to date, the duty of care has been formulated 
more narrowly.149 However, this may simply reflect that the parent companies, in 
these instances, had developed a group-wide policy specifically on health and 
safety rather than on human rights generally. The Ruggie Framework and Guiding 
Principles might inspire parent companies in the future also to develop group-
wide human rights policies.150 Moreover, if the International Commission of 
Jurists is correct to state that the tort of negligence reflects societal expectations, it 
might be suggested that it is appropriate with the ‘near universal’ social acceptance 
of the corporate responsibility to respect in the Guiding Principles, for the duty of 
care in tort to be expressed in this broader manner.151 
In comparison, in the US, where the Third Restatement effectively states a 
presumption of duty at section seven (although there are some that argue that the 
Third Restatement does not ‘restate’ negligence laws, but rather rewrites 
negligence laws), the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles could perhaps 
help plaintiffs to avoid a finding of no duty for all similarly placed plaintiffs in the 
future.152 Section seven provides that a finding of no duty can be made where 
there is a ‘countervailing principle or policy’ that ‘warrants denying liability or 
limiting liability in a particular class of cases’. But, the Ruggie Framework and 
                                                     
147 Doe v. Nestle 748 F Supp 2d 1057 (CD Cal. 2010) at 1141 and fn. 67; Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil 654 F 3d 
11 (DC Cir. 2011) at para. 4 (and fn. 9). 
148 E.g. Final Statement by the UK NCP: Afrimex (UK) Ltd, URN 08/129, 28 August 2008 at paras. 41, 
64, 77; Final Statement by the UK NCP: Vedanta Resources, URN 09/1373, 25 September 2009 at paras. 
76-78. The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises were revised, (including new reference to 
Ruggie) in 2011, in parts of the General Policies and a new chapter IV on Human Rights. 
149 Connelly v. RTZ Corp [1999] CLC 533 (QB), 536-537; Lubbe (HL) 1551; Chandler, para. 1. Described as 
credible in Connelly (QB) 538 and, of course, accepted in Chandler. 
150 Above (n. 118). 
151 ICJ, Corporate Complicity and Legal Accountability: Vol. 3, Civil Remedies (Geneva: 2008) at 16. 
Description of ‘near universal’ by Ruggie in Operationalizing, paras. 46-47; Just Business, p. 92. 
152 Notably, John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, ‘The Restatement (Third) and the Place of 
Duty in Negligence Law’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 657. In practice, s. 7 ‘adopted’ in Thompson v. 
Kaczinski 774 NW 2d 829 (Iowa Supr. 2009) but, e.g., rejected in Riedl v. ICI Americas 968 A 2d 17 (Del 
Supr. 2009).  
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Guiding Principles state a ‘policy or principle’ that business enterprises should not 
be immune from human rights based claims, especially when affected individuals 
cannot access judicial remedy elsewhere.  
Secondly, the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles might affect the 
question of whether there has been a breach of duty. The question of whether 
there has been breach is influenced by the standards of the ‘reasonable person’, 
which is in turn influenced by societal standards.153 Ruggie’s corporate 
responsibility to respect, as noted above, is based exactly on society’s expectations 
of companies.154 Therefore, if a business enterprise fails to act with the due 
diligence required under the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles and harm 
has resulted, there may be a good argument that the business enterprise has failed 
to meet the standard of care required. 
Thirdly, conversely, if a business enterprise has acted with the due diligence 
required under the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, this should help 
business enterprises to defend against a negligence claim if harm were nevertheless 
to arise. As discussed above, the Guiding Principles require business enterprises to 
take into account the same sort of factors that a court will take into account when 
deciding if there has been a breach of duty.155 Admittedly, a court and business 
enterprise could reach different conclusions on how to balance the various factors, 
but Ruggie’s seeming advice to business enterprises to keep a stronger focus on 
possible adverse human rights impacts above other factors will likely ensure that 
courts, which may place more emphasis on the cost of precautions, will be unlikely 
to find negligence.156 
Finally, the benefit of the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, from 
the perspective of those affected by corporate-related human rights abuses, might 
be to increase the potential scope of common law negligence claims. In the salient 
English cases to date, with the exception of more recent claims of environmental 
wrongdoing by transnational corporations,157 the focus has tended narrowly to be 
complaints about health and safety violations, at the workplace of a subsidiary.158 
This narrow focus in the case law in practice is problematic because, as identified 
by Ruggie in his survey in 2008 into the scope and patterns of alleged corporate-
related human rights abuse, not all or even the majority of complaints fall into this 
fact pattern.159 Moreover, other types of human rights wrongs might lead to harm 
recognised as ‘damage’ in tort laws, but are not necessarily being litigated currently. 
However, the Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles clarify the ‘near 
universal’ expectation that business enterprises have the responsibility to respect 
                                                     
153 ICJ, Corporate Complicity, 16. 
154 Ruggie, Framework, para. 54; Ruggie, Clarifying, para. 54; Ruggie, Operationalizing, paras. 46 and 48. 
155 Above text at n. 105. 
156 Commentary to GP 19. 
157 Guerrero; Trafigura; Bodo; Vava. 
158 Connelly; Ngcobo; Sithole; Lubbe; (albeit not transnational) Chandler. 
159 John Ruggie, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises: addendum: a survey of the scope and patterns 
of alleged corporate-related human rights abuse, A/HRC/8/5/Add.2, 23 May 2008. 
                         18/2014 
 
 26
all human rights and clarify that the corporate responsibility to respect extends at 
least partly to the value chain.160 Thus, one might expect a more varied fact pattern 
in transnational human rights litigation in the future, which is long overdue if there 
is no other possibility of access to an effective remedy. 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
With one exception, other authors have only briefly noted the possible analogy 
between the ‘corporate responsibility to respect’ in the second pillar of the Ruggie 
Framework and Guiding Principles and the tort of negligence in domestic 
jurisdictions. This paper has developed the analogy in detail, with focus on the US 
and UK, and has concluded that the similarities are more significant than any 
differences. Transnational human rights litigation in the UK already consists of 
mostly common law negligence complaints against transnational corporations. It 
is, however, likely that the number of state common law tort complaints against 
transnational corporations will increase in the US too after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum in April 2013.161 However, as ATS claims 
are refocused into state law tort complaints, it is also likely that the very forceful 
attacks previously directed by certain groups towards the ATS will henceforth be 
turned into attacks on the legitimacy of state law tort complaints against 
companies for human rights abuses abroad.162 Perhaps one of the legacies of 
Ruggie Framework and Guiding Principles, given the clear similarities between the 
corporate responsibility to respect in the second pillar and the tort of negligence, 
will be to help shield state common tort law claims from these criticisms when 
they inevitably come.163   
 
                                                     
160 Above text at n. 116. 
161 133 S. Ct 1659 (2013). 
162 See description of attacks on ‘second wave’ of ATS in, e.g., Michael Koebele, Corporate Responsibility 
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